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Executive Summary 
Using available financial information, this report develops a series of profit estimates for the 
firms operating in the Irish tobacco market which show they are significantly more 
profitable than other European consumer staple companies.  Between 2010 and 2012 the 
industry is found to have earned more than €110m annually in profits, and it could quite 
conceivable have been as high as €150m.  Such profits give the large transnational tobacco 
companies the financial means and a concomitant strong incentive to fight any public health 
measures that might disrupt the continuation of the tobacco market in its current form.  An 
attractive policy response identified would be for the Irish government to implement a 
special tobacco levy that is imposed on each company as a proportion of the profits they 
generate in the Irish market.  Such a levy imposed at a rate of 25% would have raised 
between €27m and €38m annually in each of the years studies.  Such revenue could be used 
to address tobacco related harm, such as funding cessation services, but would also start to 
address the massive level of profit being earned at the expense of Irish consumers.  
Furthermore, such a levy could also help facilitate a longer term move towards the direct 
regulation of tobacco prices which would be even more beneficial.  To allow for this future 
policy possibility, the forthcoming review of the EU Tobacco Tax Directive needs to be used 
to make appropriate revisions.  In the process of developing the estimate of industry profits, 
current accounting and reporting practices are also identified as being worthy of 
examination and reform.   
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Introduction 
Tobacco is an addictive product that inflicts death and disease upon society.  It is estimated, 
for example, that current smokers die on average 10 years earlier than non-smokers (Banks 
et al., 2015), that 21.13% of male deaths in Ireland in 2010 were a direct result of smoking 
(Tobacco Atlas, 2015), and for every death caused by smoking approximately 20 smokers 
are living with a smoking-related disease (Surgeon General, 2010).  Furthermore tobacco 
use creates massive financial costs to society. It is estimated for instance, that in the USA 
the average cost of smoking (including both direct medical costs and lost productivity due to 
premature death and illness), was US$289bn each year between 2009 and 2012 (Tobacco 
Atlas, 2015, p.76).  Kellner et al. (2015) offer great detail on the human and financial costs of 
smoking in England, including estimates for 2013/14 that show that the costs of smoking 
were approximately one and a half times the amount paid in tobacco duties.  All of this 
misery and the associated costs are inflicted upon society by tobacco manufacturing 
companies (henceforth tobacco companies) that generate incredible profits.  For instance, 
the profits of the world’s six largest tobacco companies was US$44.1bn in 2013 “which is 
the equivalent of the combined profits of The Coca-Cola Company, Walt Disney, General 
Mills, FedEx, AT&T, Google, McDonald’s and Starbucks in the same year” (The Tobacco 
Atlas, 2015. P.48).  Branston and Gilmore (2014, 2015) explore tobacco profitability in the 
UK market and find that in the period since 2009, tobacco companies have made profits in 
excess of £1bn each year and these are  increasing despite declining sales.  Furthermore, 
within this market companies report earning operating profits with a margin of up to 68%, 
meaning that for every £1 the company receives having paid all its tobacco duties and sales 
taxes, the company earns 68p in operating profit.  This margin compares to other European 
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consumer staple companies that earn equivalent margins that are generally in the region of 
12% to 20%.  Such massive profits are earned despite the high levels of duty and sales tax 
applied to tobacco in most markets, because the manufacturing companies are able to pass 
these taxes on to addicted consumer in the form of higher retail prices. 
It has previously been suggested that one way of addressing this extreme profitability (and 
the negative health outcomes it engenders) is to subject the industry to public utility style 
price regulation (Gilmore et al., 2010; Branston, 2013).  Such a policy would generate 
numerous health benefits by addressing the excessively strong profit incentive and would 
also allow government to capture the majority of the industries profits in the form of higher 
sales taxes but without affecting the price that consumers pay in the shops.  Unfortunately, 
legal opinion has since suggested this would be problematic to implement given current EU 
free-market rules and in particular, the current version of the Tobacco Tax Directive.   
However, since the latter is up for review shortly, there is the possibility of governments 
lobbying for appropriate changes to be made to allow for the introduction of such price 
caps.  But such efforts will take time and even if successful, would take even more time to 
implement. As such more immediate measures are needed in order to hold the industry to 
account for the sale of such deadly products from which their shareholders make such high 
returns.    
One possible idea gaining prominence in this area is a special tobacco levy to be applied to 
tobacco companies where the funds raised are hypothecated to pay for tobacco related 
activities such as smoking cessation services or health care.  Hungary, for example,  imposed 
such a special health care ‘contribution fee’ in 2015 in order to help pay for state-funded 
healthcare1 (Portfolio.Hu, 2015) whilst the US implanted a tobacco industry ‘user fee’ as 
part of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (FDA, 2009).  
Similarly, there is a strong campaign to introduce a similar fee based levy in the UK following 
formal government consultations on its introduction in late 2014 and early 2015 (see for 
instance, Kellner et al., 2015).  
Branston and Gilmore (2015) review the merits of such new tobacco levies and conclude 
that whilst all such measured are to be welcomed, revenue or fee based levies suffer from 
being paid on sales volumes (e.g. a sum paid per cigarette stick or stick equivalent sold), 
meaning that the companies will in all likelihood pass the costs onto the end consumer in 
the same way they have done with existing sales taxes.  Levies of this type will therefore 
generate revenue for smoking related activities but will do little to address industry 
profitability.  Therefore, a better approach would be to introduce a profit based levy where 
all tobacco companies involved in the Irish market have to pay a certain proportion of their 
operating profits into a special tobacco fund.  This approach would still raise considerable 
                                                          
1
 The European Commission is said to be investigating the details of this levy because the progressive nature of 
fee doesn’t treat all firms equally and hence is likely to breach the EU’s definition of equal competition. The 
issue is not the imposition of a health levy per se but just the differential rates enacted in this case. 
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revenue (which could still be hypothecated) but would do so in a way that starts to address 
extreme company profits, thereby truly compensating society for the massive harm caused 
by the products produced.  Since it would be the shareholders of the massively profitable 
tobacco companies who end up paying the levy, not addicted consumers, such a levy is 
consistent with the generally accepted principle that the polluter should pay.  Furthermore, 
the introduction of such a profit based levy would be complimentary to existing tobacco 
control policy since it would not in any way disrupt or interfere with current practice of 
setting of high tobacco duties.  It also has the advantage of starting the process of restricting 
company profitability, thereby facilitating the introducing of utility style price regulation in 
the future. 
The aim of this report is therefore to explore the possibility of implementing a profit based 
tobacco levy in the Irish tobacco market.   The remainder of the report is therefore set out 
as follows.  Section A of the report develops detailed estimates of the current profitability of 
the Irish tobacco market by drawing upon the methodology developed by Branston and 
Gilmore (2013, 2015). This starts by considering company market shares and then uses 
these alongside profit estimates for each company to estimate profitability for the entire 
market.  Section B then uses these profit estimates to explore the sums that could be raised 
by a profit levy on tobacco companies operating in the Irish market.  Finally section C 
presents the overall conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
A. Tobacco industry profitability in the Irish market 
 
Since profit data for the Irish sales of the transnational tobacco companies (TTC) isn’t 
publically available for all firms, the starting point for estimating the profitability of tobacco 
companies in Ireland is a breakdown of the market by company market share. 
 
1. Market Share 
Market share data for all legal sales was obtained for each tobacco product type (cigarettes, 
RYO tobacco, pipe tobacco, cigar and Cigarillos) from the Euromonitor passport service.  
Euromonitor is an international market intelligence company whose business relies on 
providing accurate market data to clients.  Furthermore, since this particular data was 
generated using official statistics, trade associations, trade press, company research, store 
checks, trade interviews, and trade sources, it seems reasonable to conclude that the data 
was provided by a credible and valid source.  The market share data obtained is reported in 
tables 1a to 1e below. 
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Table 1a: Company Market Share (% by volume) in the Irish cigarette Market 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
JTI 48.3 47.7 48.5 50.8 51.4 
Imperial 36.0 33.5 31.8 22.2 21.8 
BAT 11.7 11.1 10.6 11.0 11.9 
Others
 α
  4.0 7.7 9.1 16.0 14.9 
Source: Euromonitor 
α
 others covers remainder of the market but does not include illicit sales 
 
Table 1b: Company Market Share (% by volume) in the Irish cigar Market
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
JTI 51.2 51.9 51.1 50 48 
Imperial 32.3 34.6 36 6.1 6 
BAT 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Ampersand 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.9 
Hunters & 
Frankau Ltd 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 
Others
 α
 8.6 5.7 5 35.6 37.4 
Source: Euromonitor 
α
 others covers remainder of the market but does not include illicit sales 
 
Table 1c: Company Market Share (% by volume) in the Irish Cigarillos Market 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
JTI 0 0 0 0 0 
Imperial 91.6 91.8 92.1 92.9 92.4 
BAT 0 0 0 0 0 
Amerpsand 5.5 5.3 5.2 4.1 3.9 
Others
 α
 2.9 2.9 2.7 3 3.7 
Source: Euromonitor 
α
 others covers remainder of the market but does not include illicit sales 
 
 
Table 1d: Company Market Share (% by volume) in the Irish RYO tobacco Market 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
JTI 19.6 19.8 20.3 23.6 29.9 
Imperial 59.4 55.7 41.8 41.5 35 
BAT 8.8 7.5 8.6 13.4 16.9 
Others
 α
 12.2 17 29.3 21.5 18.2 
Source: Euromonitor 
α
 others covers remainder of the market but does not include illicit sales 
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Table 1e: Company Market Share (% by volume) in the Irish pipe tobacco Market 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
JTI 66.6 70.8 70.9 73.7 76.4 
Imperial 9.6 0 0 0 0 
BAT 6.3 6.6 6.6 7 7.4 
Others
 α
 17.5 22.6 22.5 19.3 16.2 
Source: Euromonitor 
α
 others covers remainder of the market but does not include illicit sales 
 
In order to estimate company market share for the overall tobacco market, these individual 
product market shares need to be weighted by the respective tobacco products’ share of 
the value of the total Irish tobacco market.  The tobacco product type share of the total 
market is given in table 1d below. 
 
Table 1f: Product Market Share (by value) of the Irish Tobacco Market (€ million) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Cigarettes 1,849.80 1,725.10 1,807.50 1,724.80 1,649.90 
RYO Tobacco 59.3 77.2 86.6 92.1 95 
Pipe Tobacco 6.9 6.5 6.2 6 5.6 
Cigars 26.6 25.7 26.6 26.3 26.2 
Cigarillos 3.3 3.4 3.6 4.2 4.2 
Total 1,945.90 1,837.90 1,930.50 1,853.40 1,780.90 
Source: Euromonitor 
 
What is striking from this data is the general decline in value of cigarette sales and the 
parallel rise in the value of RYO tobacco.  Whilst a detailed consideration of these trends 
falls outside the scope of this report, it is likely to be related to the relative prices of these 
two types of product and the emerging trend of downtrading to cheaper products and/or 
brands which has been observed in a number of markets. For the purposes herein, the 
information in table 1f tells us that in 2013, for example, cigarettes represented 92.66% of 
the overall Irish tobacco market value (€1,649.90m/€1,780.90m), and hence that the 
company market shares for cigarettes should be given a 92.66% weighting when calculating 
the overall company market shares for the entire Irish tobacco market. Similarly in 2013 
RYO tobacco should be weighted at 5%, Pipe Tobacco at 0.3%, Cigars at 1.5%, and Cigarillos 
at 0.2%.   Similar calculations are done for the other years. 
Combining such weightings with the company market shares for the different products 
allow the estimation of the individual company market share for the entire tobacco market, 
and this information is presented in table 1g below.   
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Table 1g: Company Market Shares in the total Irish tobacco market 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
JTI 47.4 46.6 47.3 49.4 50.2 
Imperial 36.7 34.4 32.3 23.0 22.4 
BAT 11.4 10.8 10.3 10.9 12.0 
Others 4.5 8.2 10.1 16.7 15.5 
Source: Authors calculation using data presented in tables 1a - 1f above.  
What the figures show is that JTI has expanded slightly its share of the overall Irish market, 
whilst BAT has remained reasonably consistent.  Imperial has witnessed a significant decline 
in market share, especially in the most recent years, with the majority of this being 
accounted for by a concomitant rise in the ‘others’ category, and to a lesser extent the 
increased share of JTI.  This trend mirrors the findings of Branston and Gilmore (2015) which 
found that Imperial also experienced a decline in UK market share at the same time. It isn’t 
exactly clear what has caused this changing trend for Imperial, but in Ireland it seems to be 
driven by changes in the cigarette and RYO segments of the market, both substantial parts 
of the overall tobacco market in which Imperial has lost significant market share to others.  
The reasons behind this change are unclear. 
     
2. Industry profitability and accounting issues 
The market share breakdown developed above now needs to be utilised alongside profit 
data for each of the major market participants in order to estimate the total profitability of 
the entire industry.  Each of these four major market shares is thus considered in turn 
(sections 3 to 6 below) in order to build-up an industry wide picture of profitability.   Where 
actual data is available it is reported, but where it is not, estimates are calculated using the 
methods detailed below which are consistent with and build upon those developed for 
estimating  UK profitability in  Branston and Gilmore (2013) and then refined in Branston 
and Gilmore (2015).  As with Branston and Gilmore (2015) a number of different scenarios 
are developed in order to explore the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions taken and 
to give a range of possible results in order to reflect the uncertainty in the calculations.  
These different scenarios are then used to calculate overall industry profitability in section 7 
and then validated in section 8.  
One particular issue encountered, and which applies to all firms to a greater or lesser 
extent, is that accounting practices make the identification of the true level of profits a 
challenge. First of all, not all of the transnational companies have Irish registered 
subsidiaries that conduct their Irish operations and hence whose accounts can be used as a 
record of their revenue and profitability generated in Ireland.  Secondly, even when data is 
currently available, it isn’t clear the extent to which it is a true reflection of actual 
profitability in Ireland.  As Branston and Gilmore (2015) identified when considering the UK 
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tobacco market, accounting practices allow TTC to generate profit in one country but report 
at least some of these profits in a different country via the use of a number of different 
subsidiary companies.  Furthermore, such accounting practices can change over time, 
making the situation further opaque.  Branston and Gilmore (2105) cite the example of the 
JTI subsidiary in the UK, which reported a significant reduction in profitability between two 
years simply because of the transfer of intellectual property rights to another JTI subsidiary.  
Such accounting changes don’t fundamentally change the profits generated by JTI in the UK 
but they made identifying it significantly more difficult.   
Such issues should be far less problematic for government since they already require all 
companies to present profit information for corporation tax purposes.  However, in light of 
the issues highlighted above government should also consider requiring all firms to file more 
detailed company accounts which cover their entire activities in any given country, even if 
profits generated in one market ultimately accrue to one or more subsidiary based 
overseas.  One way to do this would be require detailed reports of transactions conducted 
with other companies belonging to the same parent group.  This would be a change from 
current practice but would allow TTC to be more easily held to account where they are 
actually generating profits.  At the very least current rules should be strictly and clearly 
enforced.  When the accounts for the Irish subsidiary of JTI were sought for this report, it 
was discovered that the 2013 financial year accounts were not available because the 
company made a mistake in their original submission to the Companies Registration Office 
(CRO).  The entire accounts were returned to JTI in February 2015, with the requirement 
that a corrected version be returned within 14 days.  As of June 2015 no such accounts were 
available from the CRO and it isn’t clear, what, if any, penalty with be applied for this delay.    
In light of this account filing delay, this report will only consider the 2010, 2011 and 2012 
financial years. 
 
3. British American Tobacco 
BAT operates in Ireland via its local subsidiary, P.J. Carroll & Company Ltd, and this company 
files an annual return each year, meaning its reported profits are a matter of public record 
as detailed in Table 2a below. 
Table 2a: The profitability of BAT in Ireland 
 2010 2011 2012 
Net Revenue (€) 35,525,000 34,538,000 33,176,000 
Operating profit (€)  9,383,000 9,003,000 8,123,000 
Profit Margin 0.2641 0.2607 0.2448 
Source: P.J. Carroll & Company (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) and author’s calculation thereon. 
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The table shows that significant profits are made by BAT’s Irish subsidiary. In 2012 for 
example, P.J. Carroll made more than €8m in profit on sales (after taxes and duty were paid) 
of €33m, which represented a profit margin of more than 24%.  By way of a comparison, 
Branston and Gilmore (2013) report that European firms in comparable consumer staple 
industries typically made a profit margin in the range of 12-20%.  However, whilst significant 
in comparison to other industries, this rate of profit is considerably lower than the rate of 
profits estimated for the majority of the UK tobacco market in Branston and Gilmore (2015) 
and the estimates herein for the other participants in the Irish market as covered in the 
sections below.  Since prices between companies operating in Ireland are reasonably 
consistent in particular price categories and tobacco products cost relatively little to actually 
manufacture, it seems reasonable to think that company profit margins within Ireland 
would be fairly consistent between the major firms, since only brand portfolios and 
economies of scale stand as key differences. This suggests that the accounting practices 
employed by P.J. Carroll might be under-reporting the profits earned in Ireland by BAT, as 
for instance, other BAT subsidiaries might be reporting some of the profits generated in the 
Irish market.  As such we can consider the profitability reported by the BAT group as a whole 
as this should include all subsidiary companies.  The group does not provide market specific 
information but includes Ireland within its ‘Western Europe’ market area, alongside other 
(mainly) EU countries. The performance of this region is detailed in table 2b below.   
Table 2b: The profitability of BAT in their Western Europe Region 
 2010 2011 2012 
Net Revenue (£ Million) 3,419 3,600 3,442 
Adjusted Profit (£ Million) 1,054 1,228 1,186 
Profit Margin 0.3083 0.3411 0.3446 
Source:  BAT (2012, 2013, 2014) and author’s calculation thereon 
The profit rate reported for Western Europe is slightly above that reported by P.J. Carroll.  
This suggests that either Ireland is simply less profitable than other European markets, or 
that there are indeed accounting practices employed which give a misleadingly low 
impression of profit levels in Ireland.  It is doubtful that Ireland has poor levels of tobacco 
profitability relative to other markets given that it has some of the highest tobacco prices in 
Europe (see ITMAC, 2015) and other markets with high prices, such as the UK, have very 
high reported profit rates (see Branston and Gilmore, 2013, 2015).  However, in order to 
allow for both possibilities, two scenarios for the profitability of BAT in Ireland are therefore 
developed.  The ‘low’ scenario uses the reported level of profitability (as detailed in table 
2a), whilst the ‘high’ scenario uses the reported level of revenues for the Irish operations 
but with the profit margin reported for the Western Europe region (table 2b).  The 
profitability for BAT in Ireland is therefore presented in table 2c below. 
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Table 2c: Calculated Profitability of BAT in Ireland 
 2010 2011 2012 
Net Revenue (€) 35,525,000 34,538,000 33,176,000 
Low Scenario profits (€)  9,383,000 9,003,000 8,123,000 
Low Scenario profit margin 0.2641 0.2607 0.2448 
High Scenario profits (€)  10,952,358 11,780,912 11,432,450 
High Scenario profit margin 0.3083 0.3411 0.3446 
Source: authors own calculation using the information from tables 2a and 2b above. 
 
4. Japan Tobacco International 
JTI has the largest market share in Ireland and operates in this market using the JTI Ireland 
Ltd subsidiary, which files an annual return each year.  Whilst these accounts do state the 
profit made in Ireland, they unfortunately do not separate the duty and other taxes paid 
from the other cost of sales which makes calculating a profit margin problematic.  To 
address this, an estimate of the duty and taxes paid needs to be made using the limited data 
that is available.  The Irish accounts for BAT’s Irish subsidiary do identify the different 
elements of total revenue and so we use this to estimate the equivalent figures for JTI. We 
assume that the same proportion of taxes out of total revenue also applies to JTI in that 
year.  For example, in 2012 BAT had total revenue of €253,486,000 of which €220,310,000 
was duty and other taxes, meaning only 15.05% was net revenue (i.e. money the firm 
received after paying sales taxes).  Therefore it is assumed that 15.05% of JTI Irelands total 
revenue was also its net revenue for that year. Using this method, table 3a below shows the 
profitability of JTI in Ireland. 
Table 3a: The profitability of JTI in Ireland 
 2010 2011 2012 
Net Revenue (€) 115,440,477 112,184,988 100,209,109 
Adjusted Operating profit (€)  65,308,000 62,280,000 59,685,000 
Profit Margin 0.5657 0.5552 0.5956 
Source: JTI Ireland Ltd (2012, 2013, 2014) and author’s calculation thereon. 
 
5. Imperial Tobacco 
Imperial Tobacco operates in Ireland via its John Player & Sons Ltd subsidiary, which also 
distributes PMI brands such as Marlboro.  Unfortunately no detailed accounts for this 
subsidiary are available as they just refer to the accounts of the UK based parent company.  
The Imperials group accounts do provide details of the revenue and profit earned in the 
‘rest of the EU’ market which is the EU minus the specific markets of the UK, Germany and 
Spain (which are reported separately).  This information is presented in table 3a below. 
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Table 3a: The profitability of Imperial of the EU minus the UK, Germany and Spain 
 2010 2011 2012 
Net Revenue (£ Million) 1,521 1,592 1,534 
Adjusted Operating Profit(£ Million) 658 638 626 
Profit Margin      0.4326       0.4008       0.4081  
Source: Imperial (2012, 2013, 2014). 
In the absence of more accurate information our low scenario assumes that overall 
profitability for the rest of the EU applies to their Irish operations.  However, the 
profitability of JTI in Ireland suggests these might well be under estimates and so our high 
scenario assumes Imperial made the same profit margins as JTI in each year. In order to 
calculate these two scenarios the assumed rate of profitability needs to be applied to 
estimates of net revenues in order to calculate the amount of profit actually made.  The only 
realistic way of estimating these is to use the reported net revenues of BAT in Ireland 
adjusted for company market share.  For instance, in 2012 BAT had revenues of €33,176,000 
and a market share of 10.9% meaning each 1% of market share was worth €3,034,652.  
Since Imperial had an overall market share of 23% in 2012 we can estimate its net revenue 
for that year as being €98,070,185.   Applying this approach generates the estimates of 
Imperial’s profitability in Ireland as outlined in table 3b. 
Table 3b: The profitability of Imperial in Ireland 
 2010 2011 2012 
Net Revenue (€) 120,953,113 115,045,079 98,070,185 
Low Scenario Operating Profit(€) 52,325,542 46,104,749 40,020,819 
Low Scenario Profit Margin      0.4326       0.4008       0.4081  
High Scenario Operating Profit (€) 68,426,657 63,867,792 58,411,048 
High Scenario Profit Margin 0.5657 0.5552 0.5956 
Source: authors own calculations. 
 
6. Others 
The remainder of the Irish tobacco market, which we have labelled as ‘others’, is more 
difficult to estimate because by definition it includes all other companies that operate in the 
legal market which are likely to be quite varied in nature and hence have a variety of profit 
rates.  It does not include any illicit sales of any kind.  In order to account for this we again 
utilise our two scenarios.  In our low scenario we therefore assume that the remainder of 
the market is half as profitable as the Irish subsidiary of BAT in each year.  BAT is at the low 
end of the reported profitability we have examined thus far, and by using half the Irish 
reported rate we allow for the fact that some parts of the market might generate low 
profits, whilst other parts are highly profitable.     In our high scenario we simply assume the 
market is as profitable as the Irish BAT subsidiary since this has a profit margin that is lower 
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than for the other main participants and hence already allows for the fact that some parts of 
the others group might be very profitable whilst other make little profit.  The methodology 
for calculating these profit estimates is the same as that employed for Imperial Tobacco 
above.  The assumed profit margins are applied to estimates of net revenue which are 
derived from BAT’s reported revenues adjusted by market share.  The estimates are detailed 
in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Estimated Profitability of the others part of the Irish Market 
 2010 2011 2012 
Net Revenue 
 27,098,850 33,715,895 50,534,951 
Low scenario (£ million) 7,157,453 8,788,702 12,373,264 
High scenario (£ million) 3,578,726 4,394,351 6,186,632 
Source: authors own calculations. 
 
7.  Overall Profitability of the Tobacco market 
Combining all the profit estimates for the individual market shares generates estimates for 
the entire Irish market.   In keeping with the estimates of the profitability of particular 
companies, we construct low and high estimates for the entire market.  These utilise the low 
and high scenarios where they exist for particular market shares and the single profit 
estimate where they do not.  The estimates for the overall market are presented in table 7. 
Table 7: Estimated Profitability of the Irish Tobacco Market 
 2010 2011 2012 
Low scenario (€) 130,595,268 121,782,100 114,015,451 
High scenario (€) 151,844,467 146,717,406 141,901,761 
Source: authors own calculations. 
The results show that that the Irish tobacco market is very profitable, generating corporate 
profits in excessive of €110m under both scenarios in all years considered.  If the high 
scenario is taken as a guide, then it suggests that profitability was in excess of €140m in all 
years. However, it is noteworthy that these profits have been declining year-on-year, and 
this is in contrast to the estimates for the UK developed in Branston and Gilmore (2015) 
which show a continual trend of increasing profitability for the same period.  Whilst both 
markets show declining smoking rates during this period, the Irish economy was more badly 
affected by the financial crisis and austerity measures given the conditions of the IMF/EU 
financial bailout package which most likely impacted upon the firms pricing power (and 
hence profitability) during this time. 
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8. Confirming the estimates using current corporation tax paid 
One way of confirming the veracity of the profit estimate presented above is to consider the 
amount of corporation tax paid by the tobacco companies operating in Ireland.   Irish 
corporation tax is paid by each Irish registered company at the rate of 12.5% on its reported 
profits, so can be used to deduce the level of profits on which it was paid and hence the 
profitability of the market as a whole.  Such estimates will be indicative only since the 
measure of profits on which the tax is paid is different to the adjusted operating profit 
measure considered above.  The version of profit used for corporation tax purposes allows 
firms to take some deduction and other charges which reduce it relative to operating profit, 
and the tax actually paid is further complicated by deferred tax liabilities and other 
adjustments relating to previous years.  In light of these issues, profit estimates based on 
this approach should give estimates that are slightly lower than, but broadly in line with, the 
profit estimates developed using the methodology reported in sections 2 to 7 above.   We 
would also expect these corporation tax based estimates to be more variable from year to 
year given the effects of deferred liability and other adjustments made between years. 
 
Unfortunately tax records are not in the public domain, so our tax based estimates herein 
have to be based on the incomplete corporate tax information that is available in company 
annual accounts.  No such issue would be faced by government since by definition they 
would have access to full tax records of all companies.   
 
Within their Irish subsidiary company accounts, BAT and JTI highlight the corporation tax 
each paid on their Irish operations.  Table 8a reports this information, and also uses it to 
extrapolate the tax the entire tobacco sector would have paid.  For example, in 2012 BAT 
and JTI combined paid about €8m in corporate taxes and these companies collectively 
accounted for 60% of the market in that year.  Therefore we can estimate that if the other 
firms paid tax at the same rate then the sector as a whole would have paid €13.3m in 
corporate taxes.   
 
Table 8a: Estimated Corporation tax paid by the total Irish Tobacco Market based on the 
reported tax paid by BAT and JTI 
 2010 2011 2012 
BAT Corporate tax paid (€) 1,341,000 1,121,000 986,000 
JTI Corporate tax paid  (€) 7,737,000 8,899,000 7,059,000 
Combined Total  (€) 9,078,000 10,020,000 8,045,000 
JTI and BAT market share 0.5734 0.5759 0.6033 
100% market equivalent  (€) 15,829,515 17,398,611 13,335,341 
  Source: : P.J. Carroll & Company (2011,2012, 2013, 2014), JTI Ireland Ltd (2012, 2013) and author’s 
own calculations 
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These estimates of the total amount of corporate tax paid by the Irish tobacco industry can 
then be used to calculate the level of profits made by the entire industry.  Such estimates 
are presented in table 8b below which also reports the high and low scenario estimates 
derived earlier by way of a comparison.  For example, in 2012 it is estimated that corporate 
taxes of €13.3m would have been paid by the industry, and since this tax was paid at 12.5% 
it suggests that the industry therefore made profits of €106.6m. 
 
Table 8b: Estimated Irish Tobacco Market profitability 
 2010 2011 2012 
Corporate tax paid by the Tobacco market 
(€) 
 
15,829,515 17,398,611 13,335,341 
Corporate tax rate 0.125 0.125 0.125 
Tax derived profit estimate (€) 126,636,121 139,188,885 106,682,724 
Low scenario industry profits (€) 130,595,268 121,782,100 114,015,451 
High scenario industry profits (€) 151,844,467 146,717,406 141,901,761 
Source: authors own calculations and information from tables 7 and 8a 
 
Comparing the different estimates in table 8b, we can see that both methods of estimating 
industry profits are reasonably consistent with each other.   In 2010 and 2012 we can see 
that the estimates using the tax actually paid methodology are slightly below the low 
scenario estimated profits, but in 2011 the tax derived estimate is actually above the low 
scenario and is in fact closer to the high scenario.  As identified earlier, such a pattern is 
what we would expect to see because corporation tax is not paid on adjusted operating 
profits exactly but a more lenient definition of profits that allows firms to deduct various 
expenses, such as a capital allowance in excess of depreciation, and there are adjustments 
referring to past years.     The very fact that such estimates are broadly in line with our 
earlier estimates suggests we can regard our calculated low and high scenario estimates as 
being reasonable. 
 
 
B. The benefits of a Profit based Tobacco Levy 
 
Such extreme rates of profitability, far higher than other consumer staple products, gives 
the tobacco industry a strong incentive and the financial means to fight any and all 
measures that might disrupt the tobacco market, including government measures designed 
to protect the public health.  One attractive option for policy makers, especially in the 
context of the Government’s commitment to be tobacco-free by 2025 (Government of 
Ireland, 2013), might therefore be to consider the imposition of a special tobacco levy.  
Other countries are already starting to implement tobacco levies where the funds are 
hypothecated to address the harms caused by tobacco companies.  Indeed, if the funds 
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were hypothecated to fund smoking cessation services (as argued in Kellner et al, 2015) a 
levy would help create virtuous circle whereby past tobacco sales help current consumers 
quit.  It would also be consistent with the generally accepted principle that the polluter 
pays.    Branston and Gilmore (2015) consider the  rationale behind such levies in some 
detail, including the pros and cons of both a user fee type levy which is basically a specific 
tax payable per cigarette stick (or stick equivalent) sold, and a profit based levy which is 
payable on company profits.  The former is essentially just another type of tobacco duty on 
sales, but a levy on profits would be something totally new.  It would not only raise revenue 
in a way that can’t be passed on to the consumer (unlike current tobacco duty) but would 
also start to address the excessive industry profitability which is being generated alongside 
the imposition of massive costs upon society.  Furthermore, a profit based tobacco levy 
could be reasonably easy to collect since profit information is already provided to tax 
authorities given that corporation tax has to be paid. 
 
 
9. Additional Levy Revenues 
Serious consideration should therefore be given to a profit based tobacco levy that applies 
to all tobacco firms importing or manufacturing tobacco products to supply the Irish market 
and as such could be clearly identified as a tobacco specific policy.   The imposition of such a 
levy would need to be explored in more detail by appropriate government authorities that 
have access to more complete financial information on the industry, and in light of the 
political expediency of different potential rates.  However, the industry profit estimates 
developed above show that there is clear potential for significant sums to be raised at very 
little cost to the nation.  By way of some illustrative examples, table 9 below outlines 
estimates of the sort of sums that might be raised if the levy were to be applied at a rate of 
10% and 25% of industry profits. 
 
Table 9: Estimated yield from a profit based tobacco levy  
 2010 2011 2012 
Tax derived profit estimate (€) 126,636,121 139,188,885 106,682,724 
Low scenario industry profits (€) 130,595,268 121,782,100 114,015,451 
High scenario industry profits (€) 151,844,467 146,717,406 141,901,761 
10% levy using tax estimate of profits 12,663,612 13,918,888 10,668,272 
10% levy using low scenario profit estimate 13,059,527 12,178,210 11,401,545 
10% levy using high scenario profit 
estimate 15,184,447 14,671,741 14,190,176 
25% levy using tax estimate of profits 31,659,030 34,797,221 26,670,681 
25% levy using low scenario profit estimate 32,648,817 30,445,525 28,503,863 
25% levy using high scenario profit 
estimate 37,961,117 36,679,352 35,475,440 
Source: authors own calculations  
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To take 2012 as an example, table 9 shows that a 10% profit levy would raise something in 
the region of €10.7m to €14.2m in additional revenue, whilst a 25% levy would raise 
between €26.7 and €35.5m.  From such sums the costs of implementing such a levy would 
need to be deducted in order to get a true sense of the overall net revenue to be generated.  
However, as discussed above such costs could be expected to be very small given the means 
of collecting the levy are already in place.  
 
The tobacco companies would no doubt argue they are being unfairly penalised and being 
singled out to pay higher profits based taxes.   They would be right to say they are being 
singled out since the levy would be introduced because they are producing a unique product 
that inflicts significant amounts of misery, damage, and financial burden upon society whilst 
also generating a level of profitability for the industry far beyond other consumer staple 
products.  Furthermore, depending upon what rate of implementation was decided, the 
Irish government could quite reasonably say that the total amount of profit based taxes and 
levies payable in Ireland was still low compared to other countries.  As of 2015 these were, 
for example, 20% in the UK,  29.65% in Germany,  33.33% in France, and  40% in the USA 
40% (KPMG, 2015).  Such arguments and hence the ease of introducing such a levy might be 
further enhanced if the profit based tobacco levy were to be initially implemented at a 
relatively low rate, and then adjusted and increased over time.   There should also be no 
concern about the companies leaving the market in the face of the levy as they would still 
want to sell tobacco into the Irish market in order to get their massive profits and to do so 
would require a presence in Ireland.   
 
 
C. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
Using available financial information, this report has developed a series of estimates which 
demonstrate that the Irish tobacco market is inordinately profitable, comfortably earning 
more than €100m in profits each year.  Such profits give the large transnational tobacco 
companies the financial means and a concomitant strong incentive to fight any public health 
measures that might disrupt the continuation of the tobacco market in its current form.  An 
attractive policy response to address this would be for government to implement a special 
tobacco levy which is imposed as a proportion of the massive profits generated in the Irish 
market.  This would not only raise significant sums of money to address  tobacco related 
harm, such as funding cessation services, but would also start to curtail the massive level of 
profit being earned at the expense of Irish consumers.  Not only is this an attractive policy in 
its own right, but it could also help facilitate a longer term move towards the direct 
regulation of tobacco prices.  To allow this future policy possibility, the forthcoming review 
of the EU Tobacco Tax Directive needs to be used to make appropriate revisions. 
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In light of this work we therefore make the following policy recommendations to the Irish 
government: 
1. The government should look to implement a new profit based tobacco levy payable 
by all tobacco manufacturing companies supplying tobacco products into the Irish 
market. 
 
2. During the forthcoming review of the tobacco tax directive, the government should 
lobby for revisions to allow for the implantation of utility company style price 
regulation of tobacco products. 
 
3. In order to facilitate a new tobacco levy and future price regulation, and to better 
hold the industry to account again existing tobacco policy, the government should 
make sure existing accounting standards are rigorously followed so that all 
companies operating in Ireland file timely accounts that are a matter of public 
record. 
 
4. In order to gain a better picture of industry practices and profitability, reporting 
requirements should be enhanced to require tobacco firms to include detailed 
summaries within their accounts of all transaction that take place between them and 
other companies which have the same parent group. 
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